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ABSTRACT
The United States today, according to most studies, is among the least corrupt nations in the world.
But America's past was checkered with political scandal and widespread corruption that would not
seem unusual compared with the most corrupt developing nation today. We construct a "corruption
and  fraud  index"  using  word  counts  from  a  large  number  of  newspapers  for  1815  to  1975,
supplemented with other historical facts. The index reveals that America experienced a substantial
decrease in corruption from 1870 to 1920, particularly from the late-1870s to the mid-1880s and
again in the 1910s. At its peak in the 1870s the "corruption and fraud index" is about five times its
level from the end of the Progressive Era to the 1970s. If the United States was once considerably
more corrupt than it is today, then America's history should offer lessons about how to reduce
corruption. How did America become a less corrupt polity, economy, and society? We review the
findings and insights from a series of essays for a conference volume, Corruption and Reform:
Lessons from America' s History, for which this paper is the introduction that attempt to understand
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I.  Political Corruption: Today and Yesterday 
 
To most Americans today, corruption is something that happens to less fortunate people.  
A growing literature in economic development has documented the extent and consequences of 
corruption in transition economies and poor nations.  Corruption harms economic growth, as 
demonstrated by a number of studies using cross-national data.
1 
 
Most international measures of corruption rank the United States today among the lowest 
10 percent of corrupt countries worldwide.  But America’s reputation as an untarnished republic 
is a modern phenomenon.  Conventional histories of nineteenth century America portray its 
corrupt elements as similar, and at times equal, to those found in today’s modern transition 
economies and developing regions. 
 
Nineteenth-century American urban governments vastly overpaid for basic services such 
as street cleaning and construction in exchange for kickbacks given to elected officials, and these 
governments gave away public services for nominal official fees and healthy bribes.
2  As late as 
the 1950s, notes Robert A. Caro (2002), cash-filled paper bags floated in the hallowed halls of 
the U.S. Senate.  Harry S. Truman made it into the Senate as an agent of the notoriously corrupt 
Pendergast machine (McCullough 1992).  Some of the greatest U.S. higher educational 
institutions were funded by individuals infamous for their roles in extracting public resources 
through allegedly corrupt political influence—Leland Stanford and George D. Widener, whose 
surname adorns Harvard’s largest library, come to mind.  The Presidential legacies of Ulysses 
Grant and Warren Harding were forever marred by the Crédit Mobilier and Teapot Dome 
scandals, respectively.   
 
If the United States was once more corrupt than it is today, then America’s history should 
offer lessons about how to reduce corruption.  After all, the dominant political movement of the 
                                                 
1 The literature begins with Mauro (1994) and includes, for example, Hellman, Jones, and Kaufman 
(2003), and Leite and Weidmann (2002).  Another part of this literature has examined the extent and 
consequences of corruption within a country (e.g., Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003; Gaviria 2002; 
McMillan and Zoido 2004; and Swenson 2003).  These empirical papers give support to a theoretical 
literature (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1975; Shleifer and Vishny 1993) about the negative consequences of 
corruption. 
2 See, for example, Glaeser (2003), Menes (this volume), and Steffens (1905). Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  2
early twentieth century—Progressivism—was dedicated to the elimination of corruption.  From 
1901 to 1917, under Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, a legislative and administrative 
agenda was justified in part by a need to reduce corruption.  On a more local level, throughout 
the twentieth century municipalities and states regularly elected reform slates that promised to 
exercise a strong hand to root out corruption.  Crusading journalists and ambitious prosecutors 
have also frequently taken aim at corruption.  While scholars can debate the impact of these 
various forces, there is no debate that U.S. history offers many examples of reform movements 
that claimed as a primary goal to reduce corruption, just like reformers in developing countries 
today. 
 
In the volume Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America’s History for which this 
essay is an introduction, we take stock of corruption and reform in American history.
3  The 
essays address different aspects of understanding corruption.  John Wallis, Rebecca Menes and 
this introductory essay all discuss what we mean by “corruption.”  Conceptual clarity is a pre-
condition for measuring the amount of corruption over time and space.  This introductory essay, 
the Menes paper and that by Engerman and Sokoloff, all address the difficult problem of 
measuring the extent of corruption over time.  Because corruption is generally illegal, or at least 
embarrassing, it tends to be hidden, and as the modern cross-national empirical literature has 
found, measurement is difficult.  We will argue that there is reason to believe that corruption 
increased during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century or was at a high level in the 
ante-bellum era with much temporal variance.  We have better evidence documenting a decline 
in American corruption from the mid-1870s to the 1920s.   
 
After discussing the meaning and measurement of corruption, two of the essays in 
Corruption and Reform address the consequences of corruption or of weak legal regimes more 
generally.  Lamoreaux and Rosenthal discuss the rise of corporations during the late nineteenth 
century and how the rise was accompanied by decreased protection of minority shareholder 
rights.  Cutler and Miller look at the spread of clean water in America’s cities during an era of 
legendary municipal corruption.  Clearly corruption does not alone determine the extent of public 
good formation.  According to Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, the number of corporations in the late 
                                                 
3 See the end of the Reference list of this essay for the titles of the conference papers to which we refer. Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  3
nineteenth century exploded, despite inadequate protection of minority shareholders, because 
returns to scale in production increased.  Cutler and Miller argue that the increasing availability 
of municipal credit during the Gilded Age made large-scale water projects feasible.  Of course, 
the increase in municipal credit availability must have had something to do with improvements 
in accountability suggesting that some forms of corruption had been curtailed. 
 
After addressing corruption, the essays in Corruption and Reform turn to the causes and 
consequences of reform.  Bodenhorn’s essay reviews one of the first episodes of anti-corruption 
reform in U.S. history: the fight against corruption in the chartering of New York banks during 
the late 1830s.  He argues that this reform emerged from political competition and a desire of the 
Whigs to deprive their opponents—Van Buren’s Democratic Regency—of the rents of 
patronage.  Deregulation, therefore, was the weapon of choice against corruption since reducing 
chartering requirements limited the ability of government to corruptly manage their monopoly. 
 
Novak’s essay describes the legal environment in the late nineteenth century and depicts 
an era of increasing regulatory activism.  The regulation was often rationalized as a tool to 
protect consumers, but as two of the essays, those by Fishback, and Law and Libecap, note the 
situation was often more complex.  Fishback looks at the rise of workplace safety regulation in 
manufacturing and mining industries.  He finds that workplace safety regulation was supported 
by unions and opposed by manufacturers in the case of mining.  But in manufacturing, 
workplace safety laws were intended to raise costs for small firms as much as they were to 
protect workers and were, therefore, championed by large firms.  Law and Libecap look at the 
introduction of the Food and Drug Administration.  Passage of the FDA was driven by a 
combination of producer interests and consumer concerns about food quality.  However, there is 
evidence suggesting that consumer outrage was manipulated and produced institutions that were, 
at least in the short run, only moderately aimed at protecting their interests.  Law and Libecap 
also emphasize the role played by the press in creating support for state regulation. 
 
The paper by Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin documents the rise of the independent press 
and the remarkable transformation in U.S. newspapers between 1870 and 1920.  In 1870, the 
press was partisan, histrionic, and prone to omit facts that went against acknowledged political Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  4
biases.  In 1920, most newspapers had dropped party affiliations, used more moderate and civil 
language, and made at least a pretense of reporting the facts of the day without spin.  The article 
argues that the rise of the press was fundamentally the result of the increasing financial returns to 
selling newspapers rather than placating politicians for patronage and other reasons.  While the 
essay does not document the impact that the press may have had on corruption, it does discuss 
circumstantial evidence suggesting that the rise of the independent press was an important factor 
in movements to reform American political corruption.   
 
Troesken looks at a particular outcome of these reform movements: public ownership of 
utilities, specifically water.  Troesken discusses evidence that suggests that both the move to 
public ownership in the early twentieth century and the move away from public ownership 75 
years later were associated with gains in service quality.  He suggests that the evidence is either 
compatible with the view that ownership was productive during the earlier corruption but less 
productive today, or with Mancur Olson’s (1982) view that change in any direction reduces 
corruption, at least in the short run, because of an ossification of bureaucracy.
4   
 
Finally, Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor look specifically at corruption in the provision of 
public relief such as welfare and unemployment insurance.  They argue that the move to federal 
provision played a major role in reducing the level of corruption in the welfare system.  The 
institutional change came about because the effectiveness and credibility of the Roosevelt 
administration would have been seriously hampered by allegations of corruption, at the same 
time that it would not have received the same benefits that local leaders would from having a 
corrupt system.  Because of the separation between national and local authority, Roosevelt had 
an incentive to put checks on corruption in place and these checks reduced the amount of 
corruption in the system.  This article, and the Bodenhorn essay, suggest the role that separation 
of powers and inter-governmental competition can play in bringing about effective reform.   
 
                                                 
4 Thomas Jefferson’s often-cited quotation makes a similar point: “The tree of liberty must be refreshed 
from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.” Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  5
II.  Corruption: Definitions and Theory 
 
As Wallis’s essay makes clear, the term corruption has its origins in an analogy between 
the state and the human body.  In its first incarnation, corruption referred to the process by which 
a well-functioning system of government decays into one that fails to deliver and maltreats its 
citizens.  According to the Greek historian Polybius (c.200-120 BCE), monarchy corrupts into 
tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into mob rule. 
 
During the nineteenth century, the view of corruption changed into a definition 
specifically related to the bribery of public officials by private agents.  Bribery was generally an 
illicit payment in exchange for some government controlled resource, such as an overpayment 
for a service or public property or an exemption from government regulation.  These three forms 
of corruption, as described by Menes, form the lion’s share of what is known about nineteenth 
century municipal corruption.  City governments were corrupt in the purchasing of inputs such as 
street cleaning or construction services, and bribes were given in exchange for overpayment for 
these inputs.  City governments were also corrupt in the distribution of publicly-owned property 
such as land or access to a port, all of which were sold not to the highest bidder for the good of 
the citizens but to most generous briber for the benefit of the few.  Finally city governments were 
corrupt in the administration of rules, such as prohibitions on gambling and prostitution, and 
accepted bribes for leniency in this administration. 
 
These two views of corruption—the systematic or Polybian type and the venal or bribery 
form—suggest a definitional synthesis.  Corruption is the loss to the public from the subversion 
of formal, or implicit, rules of government behavior.  The losses may involve a classic welfare 
loss, such as the loss from underinvestment because corrupt judges do not necessarily protect 
property rights.  The loss may instead or in addition be a reallocation from the public to 
politicians or from the public to bribing businessmen.  Within this broad definition of corruption, 
there are several ways to parse corrupt behavior. 
 
One reasonable division is to separate corruption into that which is legal and that which is 
illegal.  Most modern corruption is viewed as illegal, but there are also prominent forms of legal Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  6
corruption.  In the framework of the definition, legal corruption involves losses due to the 
evasion of implicit rules, not formal laws.  Thus, going back to the ideas of Polybius, tyranny 
may reflect an abuse of power that leads to large public welfare losses.  But if there are no legal 
barriers against the king, then the corruption is not illegal.  In the more modern context, George 
Washington Plunkitt’s description of honest graft is best thought of as legal corruption.  Honest 
graft, in Plunkitt’s terminology, is the gain of wealth by public officials through private 
information, such as the proposed route of a new highway.  The expropriation of this information 
involved a loss of wealth to the public, but it was not necessarily illegal. 
 
Since we define corruption as the loss or transfer of public wealth, corruption is “bad,” at 
least relative to some ideal outcome.  Of course, in some cases the relevant comparison is not an 
abstract ideal.  For example, as many authors have recognized, in the presence of social-welfare 
decreasing rules, corruption that relaxes those rules may actually be socially beneficial.  Of 
course, a better outcome for the public would be to change the regulation or auction off permits 
to violate the regulation where the proceeds from the auction are returned to the public treasury.   
 
Still, there is always a question of the full social cost of corruption.  In some cases, the 
private returns to corrupt officials may be offset by paying officials lower wages in expectation 
of corrupt gains (as in Becker and Stigler 1974).  In other cases, corruption may ultimately 
involve a transfer of wealth from one group to another without net social loss.  In other instances, 
corruption of the political system may lead to a breakdown in property rights enforcement that 
causes economic collapse.  Corruption in the education sector in the developing world appears 
related to under-provision of schooling which may in turn seriously retard long run growth 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2004).  An important question, one that reappears frequently but which 
is never adequately answered, is what the full cost of American corruption was.    
 
The economic approach to corruption (as in Rose-Ackerman 1975) starts with the costs 
and benefits facing potentially corrupt public officials.  Since economics predicts that we should 
expect to see corruption when the benefits are high and costs are low, it is worth analyzing what 
factors should impact the benefits and costs of corrupt behavior by a government official.  The 
benefits from being corrupt are determined by the ability of a government official to increase Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  7
someone’s private wealth; the costs come from the expected penalties from being caught. 
 
What determines the ability of a government official to increase someone’s private 
wealth?  The most obvious means is to pay the person out of the public purse.  In extreme 
circumstances, the person can just be the official himself; embezzlement is one example of 
corrupt behavior.  More usually, paying someone out of the public purse occurs in exchange for 
services of some form, either labor or subcontracting.  If fees are close to the costs of contracting 
firms or the opportunity costs of workers, then the opportunities for corruption are limited.  If 
fees are significantly above free market prices, then there is opportunity for corruption in the 
assignment of work.  High public sector wages and discretion over hiring has traditionally 
created some of the best opportunities for corrupt earnings.  
 
This simple analysis helps us to understand some of the most popular reforms attempted 
to arrest corruption.  Civil service reform which would take patronage out of the hands of 
politicians and replace discretion with test-based rules would naturally serve limit the 
opportunity for corruption, especially when combined with a rigid pay scale for civil servants.
5  
Rules concerning procurement fees have also tended to be a popular tool against corruption.  
Competitive bids for public projects linked to the requirement that the government accept the 
low cost bid is one of the simplest means of limiting corruption in administration of government 
projects.  The approach relies on the existence of a competitive supply of contractors. 
 
The second means that public officials have to create private wealth is to transfer 
government property to private individuals for their own profit.  The transfer of government land 
to traction companies was a popular form of corruption in the nineteenth century.  Information 
about future government actions is a more subtle form of in-kind transfer.  The returns to 
corruption in these cases depend on the size of the assets at the government’s disposal and the 
discretion that individuals have in the distribution of these assets.   
 
The third primary means that governments have to create private wealth is the 
manipulation of legal rulings or the enforcement of rules, such as regulations.  Rules banning 
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gambling and prostitution, for example, create the opportunity to extract bribes from potential 
providers.  These bribes can be extracted by any and all members in the chain of enforcement.  
As the amount of regulation increases, the opportunity to extract bribes also rises and leads 
reformers to fight against regulation and government monopoly (as in Bodenhorn’s essay).  
Conversely, the connection between the intrusiveness of regulation and the ability to extract 
bribes creates an incentive for politicians to push for further regulation.   
 
Even in a libertarian’s dream world where the government is restricted to enforcing 
disputes over property rights, there would still be considerable scope for corruption in the 
arbitration of these disputes.  Every dispute over ownership creates the possibility for a corrupt 
ruling.  After all, a corrupt judge can extract bribes even if when he rules in favor of the rightful 
owner.  As the legal system has the ability to redistribute all of the wealth in society, the 
opportunities for corruption within the system are enormous.  As corruption within the courts 
destroys the clear definition of property rights, this corruption has the potential to turn the 
libertarian dream into a Hobbesian nightmare.  In practice, this ability may be limited by the 
ability of private litigants to rely on private arbitration and avoid a corrupt legal system.  
 
Together these factors suggest that the benefits of corruption will rise with the size and 
discretion of the government and the amount of social and economic regulation.  Benefits from 
corruption will also rise when the size of assets or damages involved in property rights disputes 
increases (as in Glaeser and Shleifer 2003).  As we will discuss later, the late nineteenth century 
was a period of increasingly larger governments, more valuable public assets, more aggressive 
regulation (as discussed by Novak’s essay) and bigger stakes litigation.  The potential benefits 
from corruption rose during the period along almost every dimension. 
 
The limits on corruption have customarily come from three sources: legal penalties, 
career or social costs, and internal psychic pain.  Thus, the overall costs of corruption come from 
the size of the potential penalties and the probability that these costs are imposed which are in 
turn a function of information flows, social opprobrium, and the legal system.   
 
The most obvious parameter influencing the cost of legal corruption is the stated legal Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  9
penalty for corrupt practices.  While this is certainly obvious, it is also important to remember 
that these penalties have changed significantly over time.  For example, while Plunkitt’s honest 
graft—the use of insider information by politicians to enrich themselves—was surely corruption, 
at least by our definition, it was completely legal during Plunkitt’s era.  Even the gifts of railway 
stock given to congressmen during the Crédit Mobilier scandal were perfectly legal at the time.  
At the start of U.S. history, the number of laws on corruption was so modest that legal penalties 
against corruption were often negligible.  Since that time, there has been a steady increase in the 
range of behaviors by public officials that are punishable by law and a steady increase in the 




Laws always require enforcement, and while the range of legal behavior has generally 
contracted over time, the time path of enforcement quality is far less clear.  Enforcement both 
requires some form of initial information about the corrupt action—reported either by a 
government investigator or by some third party—and then a legal proceeding that acts on this 
information.  Public knowledge of corruption has been revealed mainly by third parties or by 
investigators from some branch of government separated from the actual corruption.  As the 
Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin paper reminds us, the press has played a major role in exposing 
scandals like Crédit Mobilier and Teapot Dome.  However, in some cases, such as the famous 
exposure of the Tweed Ring’s corruption by the press, exposure was initiated by a rival 
politician.   In our own era, journalistic careers, such as those of investigative reporters Robert 
Woodward and Carl Bernstein writing for the Washington Post, have been made through intrepid 
uncovering of governmental malfeasance. 
 
Government does, however, occasionally police itself.  Today there are hundreds of 
prosecutions of state and local officials by federal investigators under the national Corrupt 
Practices Act.  The Tweed Ring faced legal prosecution not by local city police, who were 
generally part of the ring, but rather through prosecution by officials of New York State.  Today, 
perhaps 80 percent of public corruption prosecutions are brought by federal officials (Corporate 
                                                 
6 RICO is the acronym for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, passed by Congress 
in 1970. Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  10
Crime Reporter 2004).  Separation of powers and federalism create rivalries between different 
government actors and these rivalries create incentives to uncover and prosecute corruption.  Of 
course, the true importance of self-policing is understated because in cases where internal 
monitoring functions well, corruption is unlikely to appear in the first place. 
 
To generate legal penalties, the uncovering of corruption must then be followed by 
successful legal prosecution, which in turn requires an independent judiciary.  Effective 
prosecution requires that judges are willing to convict officials who are proved to be corrupt.  
Conviction will occur if the legal system is itself free from corruption, but even if judges are 
themselves corrupt, they may still be willing to convict corrupt politicians if their political 
interests conflict with those of the accused politicians.  Judges appointed by a Republican 
machine, even if they were completely complicit in that machine’s corruption, would still be 
quite willing to convict a corrupt representative of an urban, Democratic machine.  The rise of 
professionalism in the judiciary has meant that it is increasingly less likely that a corrupt 
politician can count on a friendly judge to let him off.   
 
Even if the judicial system is dormant, the revelation of corruption can still create costs if 
this revelation damages a politician’s career or social standing.  For a politician, career costs 
typically depend on the willingness of voters to oust corrupt officials.  The track record of the 
electorate is mixed in this area.  There are many examples of notoriously corrupt officials being 
regularly re-elected perhaps because the corruption is funneled back to voters or is offset by 
other advantages or because voters are sufficiently cynical (or realistic) that they think that 
political challengers are likely to be no less corrupt than the incumbents.  The political career of 
James Michael Curley, whose corrupt actions eventually landed him in jail, was only really in 
danger when he faced political challengers who combined a clean image with the same 
aggressive Hibernianism—Irish-Catholic jingoism—that Curley championed.  Naturally, the role 
of career concerns suggests that corruption will be more costly in areas with robust competition 
between two or more political parties.  
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III.  The Time Path of Corruption in the United States 
 
Measuring corruption is a difficult task with certain similarities to the problem of 
measuring crime.  There are three ways of measuring crime: (1) crimes reported to the police, (2) 
crimes leading to a conviction or trial, and (3) victimization surveys.  The primary difference 
between reported crimes and victimization surveys is that reported crimes are those reported to 
the police and victimization surveys are crimes reported to surveyors.  Victimization surveys are 
generally thought to be the best measure of crime because they avoid the problem of 
underreporting particularly in high crime areas.  But such surveys are not available for the case 
of corruption and corruption-related crimes reported to the police are also rare.  Reports of 
corruption generally come from newspaper articles about investigations not from the victims, 
who are often all of the citizens.   
 
As such, historical research on corruption must turn to other sources and methods.  One 
method, which we follow here, is to use public documents such as newspapers to proxy for 
reported crimes.  While there are no historical victimization surveys or crime reports that can be 
used, corruption was reported in the press.  Obviously, there are many reasons to question the 
use of newspaper reporting as an indicator of underlying facts (indeed Gentzkow, Glaeser and 
Goldin emphasize the changing bias of the media), but given the absence of other measures, 
media coverage of corruption offers one possible means of assessing the amount of reported 
corruption.  
  
Another direction is to rely on trial records.  The Corporate Crime Reporter (2004) has 
recently ranked the 50 states on the basis of their public corruption convictions per capita.  Given 
that enforcement is generally federal and may not vary much by state, this measure may capture 
the degree of corruption by state.  The rankings that place Mississippi and Louisiana as the first 
and third most corrupt states, and Oregon and New Hampshire as the second and third least 
corrupt states, accord well with standard preconceptions.  In principle, it might be possible to 
collect a data base of public officials indicted for corruption, but that would be difficult. 
 
With the advent of optical scanning technology, there are now a large number of digitally Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  12
searchable newspapers published in the United States, some going back to the late eighteenth 
century.  The drawback of using newspapers is that reporting often differs from the underlying 
reality.  Changes in reporting can reflect changes in the newspaper market rather than actual 
changes in corrupt activity.  
 
Our approach is to search for the words “corruption” and “fraud” (and their variants) and 
to count the appearance of articles (or pages) containing these words.  This count gives us a 
measure of the amount of space newspapers gave to stories about corruption and fraud.  We then 
deflate these counts by the number of articles (or pages) containing the words “January” or 
“political” (and its variants).  This count gives us a measure of the overall size of the newspaper 
(in the case of January) or the overall amount of attention given to politically-relevant stories.  
Our results are not particularly sensitive to the exact choice of deflator words.
7 
 
We use two sources that are available electronically on-line in fully searchable editions: 
the New York Times (Proquest) and a large group of small-town newspapers (Ancestry.com).
8  
The New York Times has several advantages.  Because it is one newspaper the series does not 
have a changing composition of papers.  The Times is among the most serious American papers 
and by the late nineteenth century it was unlikely to have made unsubstantiated claims about 
corruption or knowingly omitted major stories on corruption. 
 
Relying on the Times has the disadvantages that it affords us primarily a picture of New 
York City and its reporting begins in 1851 with the establishment of the paper.  To supplement 
the evidence from the Times, we use a large collection of newspapers available from 
www.ancestry.com, a website containing sources including the U.S. population censuses and 
immigration records of particular value to genealogists.
9  The papers are geographically spread 
                                                 
7 The difference between the “January” and “political” deflators is most pronounced in the early, pre-1860 
era because the majority of newspaper stories in the ante-bellum period were political.  As newsprint 
prices plummeted, more attention was devoted to other types of stories and features. 
8 By small town newspapers we mean papers such as the Bangor Daily Whig and Courier (Bangor ME), 
the Lorain Standard (Elyria OH), the Adams Sentinel (Gettysburg PA), the Janesville Gazette (Janesville 
WI), the Morning Oregonian (Portland OR), and the Statesville Landmark (Statesville NC). 
9 Because the Ancestry.com site is updated almost daily, we did the counts during a short interval.  At the 
time of this writing a yearly membership for the entire website, including census and immigration data, 
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throughout the United States mainly from small cities and towns and have fairly good coverage 
by the early nineteenth century.  The disadvantage is that the composition of papers changes over 
time.  Although neither series is perfect, they yield a remarkably similar picture for the century 
of overlap. 
 
We have presented in Figure 1 three series given as three-year centered moving averages 
to smooth the data.  The series that are deflated by “political” are remarkably close in the period 
of overlap (the correlation coefficient between the two series is 0.943 for the period 1852 to 
1960).
10  If the variation in corruption reporting were caused by reporting fads or changes in the 
market for news, these fads and market changes must have had a remarkable consistency 
between New York City and small town America. 
 
One check on the series is to see whether the reporting corresponds well with known 
facts about corruption.  Do peaks in the series occur during periods known to have contained 
considerable be corruption?  Table 1 gives thumbnail sketches of the major stories during the 
local peaks in “corruption” and “fraud” in Figure 1. 
 
The first great boom in corruption reporting occurs around the 1840 election.  Stories of 
corruption during this period focused on Tammany Hall and also Martin Van Buren, the first 
President who owed his success to a political machine (for a description of Van Buren’s 
activities in the banking sector, see the Bodenhorn essay).
11  The next peak in corruption 
reporting occurred between 1857 and 1861 and focused on voting irregularities in Kansas.  There 
is a global peak in the 1870s during the Grant administration.  Top stories concerned Crédit 
Mobilier, the Whiskey Ring, and Reconstruction and the Ku Klux Klan.  Finally, there is a small 
local peak in the late 1920s during the era of prohibition and the Teapot Dome scandal.  The New 
York Times series is similar and shows basic patterns which conform to our notions about periods 
of major corruption in U.S. history.  
 
Both series reveal one major trend—reporting on corruption declined between 1870s and 
                                                 
10 The correlation is likely enhanced by the copying by small town newspapers from the larger city papers 
and also by the use of wire services. 
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the 1920s.  The decline, moreover, is concentrated in both series from the mid-1870s to 1890 and 
in the 1910s.  In the 1870s our index (deflated by political) was greater than 0.8, but ever since 
1930, the index has hovered around 0.2.  If these series reflect anything about reality then it is 
hard not to conclude that there was a significant secular decline in corruption. 
 
The first period of sustained decreased reporting on corruption and fraud, from the mid-
1870s to 1890, was an era of reform when New York City under Honest John Kelly was far 
“cleaner” than it had been under Boss Tweed.  At the national level, no administration has ever 
faced the litany of scandal that embarrassed Ulysses S. Grant.  It seems reasonable that the 
decline in our index reflects a cleansing of politics, even though the decline occurred during the 
heart of the Gilded Age. 
 
The first period of sustained decline in our index is followed by one of stability from 
about 1895 to 1908.  The period—a high point of the Progressive Era—does not seem likely to 
have been a moment when reform stood still.  Instead, a more reasonable reading of the data is 
that even if reform continued, the vast attention paid to corruption by muckraking journalists 
meant that the series was stable despite continuing reductions in corruption.  Perhaps, it is 
worthwhile noting that contrary to the view that Progressive Era muckrakers brought to the 
media a new awareness of corruption, our series show that such attention was much higher 
before.  Our series, however, cannot reveal whether the informational content of the Progressive 
Era muckrakers was substantially higher than the more histrionic reporting of the earlier era. 
 
The second period of decline occurs between 1908 and 1917.  This period was 
legitimately one of significant reform, and it is certainly possible that corruption dropped 
significantly during this era.  Of course, it is also true that increasing coverage of the Great War 
may well have pushed corruption off of the front pages.  After this period, there is a rise in the 
late 1920s, but even during this period, reporting on corruption never gets close to the levels of 
the middle nineteenth century.  At least if reporting is any kind of indication, by the 1930s, 
corruption in the United States was nothing like the corruption of the nineteenth century. 
 
The time path shown by these series is compatible with mainstream histories of the Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  15
period.  The traditional view of much of the nineteenth century is that it was replete with great 
corruption and the traditional view of the early twentieth century (see, for example, Hofstadter 
1955) is that Progressive Era reforms were effective and that corruption actually fell.  
Furthermore, scattered evidence on conviction in high places also supports the downward trend 
observed in the index.  For example, while charges of venal corruption were regularly leveled 
against nineteenth century New York City mayors like Fernando Wood, Oakey Hall (a member 
of the Tweed Ring), and Robert Van Wyck, no New York City Mayor since William O’Dwyer, 
50 years ago, has been seriously accused of corrupt activity.  Indeed, since Van Wyck more than 
100 years ago, only O’Dwyer and James Walker seem to have been notably corrupt.   
 
The time series gives clear evidence for a decline in corruption since the mid-1870s, but 
the evidence on the early periods in the nineteenth century is less clear.  The year-to-year 
variation is large and it is hard to uncover any clear secular pattern.  If the ante-bellum series are 
taken seriously (and there is much noise in these figures) then there was a steady rise in reporting 
about corruption between 1815 and 1850 and no change between around 1850 and 1870.  This 
time pattern corresponds with the views of some historians and it can be connected with the rise 
in government budgets and the scale of the economy (as argued by Glaeser and Shleifer 2003).  
While the data are consistent with the view that corruption followed an arc first rising between 
1815 and 1850 and then falling after 1870, the evidence for the early rise is weaker than that 
supporting the subsequent fall.  
  
IV.  Reform and the Fight against Corruption 
 
To understand changes in corruption and its prosecution over time, it is vital to have both 
a theory of corruption as well as one of reform.  The theory of corruption is the more 
straightforward of the two because reform is rarely a unilateral decision.  For example, reform 
has seldom been credited to a particular political leader.  There have been exceptions as in the 
cases of the two Roosevelts and Woodrow Wilson, although even their efforts are best seen as 
culminations of lengthy reform movements.     
 
The essays in Corruption and Reform deal with three main theories about the rise of Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  16
reform.  The first theory views institutional change as welfare maximizing and argues that 
institutional reform is more likely to succeed the higher are the social benefits of reform.  The 
theory has an old pedigree: the reformers themselves argued that their proposed policies would 
benefit society and the view dominated mid-twentieth century historical writings on reform (e.g., 
Hofstadter 1955).  A second, revisionist theory follows Stigler (1971) and emphasizes the power 
of certain producers in shaping regulation.  According to this view, regulation and reform fit the 
needs of big producers who want to increase their rival’s costs.  Finally, a third theory (suggested 
by Law and Libecap), argues that reform is driven by political entrepreneurs who sometimes 
gain support both through manipulating popular opinion and the tools of government. 
 
The welfare maximizing view of reform was that espoused by the reformers themselves.  
The rhetoric used by Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and intellectuals behind reform 
such as Herbert Croly and John Landis, all suggested that reform was needed to solve a variety 
of social ills.  Some proponents of social choice theory suggest, perhaps optimistically, that 
political outcomes will tend towards the Pareto frontier.  They argue that if there are rents to be 
gained (as there always are in systems away from the frontier), coalitions will form to extract 
those rents.  Modern work on reform and regulation occasionally adopts this view (as in Glaeser 
and Shleifer 2003) and views reforms as welfare-maximizing in a world in which all institutions 
are subject to different forms of corruption. 
 
This view of reform implies that reform movements should arise when the net social 
benefits of reform outweigh the costs.  According to Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor, federal 
oversight of New Deal relief eliminated corruption that had been endemic to transfer programs at 
the state and local levels.  If this view is correct, we should see corruption-reducing federal 
control over welfare programs whenever the benefit exceeds the costs of central control, such as 
a lesser ability to target welfare most accurately or a weighty bureaucracy or the fixed costs of 
reform itself.  More generally, we should expect to see more reform when corruption is high, 
possibly resulting from an ossified system as in Olson (1965; see also Troesken), or because 
exogenous variables have increased the returns to corruption (as in Glaeser and Shleifer 2003).  
This view also predicts reform will occur when the cost of introducing reformed institutions 
decreases, perhaps due to more-educated and better-informed elites with greater abilities to Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  17
monitor such institutions. 
 
The second, revisionist, view of reform argues that reform is controlled by well-
organized special-interest groups.  In the case of regulation of industry, the relevant interest 
groups are big firms.  This view predicts that regulation will cater to the needs of those 
businesses.  According to this view we should see more reform when the benefits it provides to 
big firms are greater or when their political clout is greater.  One somewhat surprising 
implication of this Stiglerian view is that it suggests that Progressive era reform and regulation 
may not have signaled the triumph of popular sovereignty over business interests, but rather the 
triumph of particular businesses over the state.   
 
Of course, business interests and social welfare are occasionally well aligned and in such 
cases the first and second views of reform are difficult to disentangle.  In many instances both 
business and the public may want to make it difficult for public officials to extract protection 
money from firms.  In some cases, firms may be better off with relatively honest politicians who 
do not try to extort income from new firms.  In such an instance, both firms and society as a 
whole might be better off with reforms that raise the costs to political actors of accepting bribes.   
 
The third view of reform looks neither to special interest groups nor to public welfare as a 
whole, but to political entrepreneurs.  According to this view, reforms are put forward by 
political entrepreneurs who seek either to get elected on a reforming ticket or be appointed to 
some new administrative body created as a result of reform.  In the case of a perfectly informed 
electorate, this view and the first, welfare-maximizing, view of reform become identical.  But in 
cases where the electorate is less than perfectly informed and its opinions can be shaped by 
entrepreneurs (as argued by  Law and Libecap), this view of reform yields different positive 
predictions about when we should expect to see reform.  It also yields different predictions about 
the welfare benefits of reform and implies that reform may be socially costly.   
 
One variant on this theory is that the “cry of reform” is basically the natural complement 
to accusing one’s opponent of being corrupt, and any challenger, unless the opponent is known 
to be squeaky clean, will be tempted to make the accusation.  One natural impediment to the “cry Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  18
of reform” occurs when the challenger has been part of the system and another is that reforms 
generally reduce rents to politicians when they get elected.  As such, reform is most likely to be 
championed by political entrepreneurs who have not been part of the system and who are 
unlikely to be able to take advantage of corruption.  Real reform, therefore, will occur more often 
when long-standing political control by one party is broken by another (as argued by 
Bodenhorn). 
 
The view predicts that we should expect to see more reform when there are greater 
political returns to entrepreneurs who emphasize reform.  These returns could be high because of 
political variables, such as a tight race which might be decided by a group that can be influenced 
to care about reform.  If the returns to government office, or controlling a government 
bureaucracy, have increased, then this will also increase the supply of reforming politicians.  
Finally, changes in communications technology that will make it easier to convince people of the 
benefits of reform (even if those benefits do not exist) will increase the amount of reform. 
 
There is no question that each of these theories has been important during certain epochs 
of reform.  Certain railroad regulations benefited incumbent firms more than they did consumers.  
Political entrepreneurs spearheaded reforms, like the Food and Drug Act of 1906, and in many 
cases, the reform appears to have benefited politicians far more than the public at large.  There 
are even cases where public welfare seems to have benefited from attempts at reform.   
 
It is also true that all three theories can potentially explain the broad time paths of reform 
over the past 150 years.  Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) argue that Progressive era reforms were 
necessary because an increasing scale of enterprise made old institutions unable to handle 
increasing incentives for corruption.  As such, early twentieth century reform was a response to 
the increased corruption created by increased scale.  A Stiglerian view is that increased scale and 
business power, naturally led to business-friendly reforms.  Finally, changes in public literacy 
and sophistication, the media, the size of government and the returns to offices, might have all 
acted together to give political entrepreneurs greater ability and desire to sell reform to the 
public.  As such, it is difficult to disentangle the relative importance of the three theories of 
reform.  They are touched on by many of the essays in Corruption and Reform. Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  19
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Corruption within the United States appears to have followed something of an arc—an 
inverted, backwards J-shape beginning at a high level with a small increase and ending with a 
spectacular decrease.  The early period in U.S. history was probably a bit less corrupt than the 
Gilded Age that followed.  But rule-breaking in the modern era is far more circumspect than in 
the early twentieth century.  If there was a rise in corruption across the nineteenth century, the 
rise can be easily explained by the increasing scale of both government and the economy.  Vast 
increases in the budgets of local governments greatly increased the potential benefits of 
corruption.  It would be surprising if corruption did not increase between 1800 and 1870. 
 
But the decline in corruption between the mid-1870s and 1920 was not associated with 
declining returns to corruption.  The size of the government continued to rise and the returns 
from corruption in the judiciary increased as well.  The big change over the twentieth century has 
been in the costs facing corrupt politicians.  In 1900, many actions we would now prosecute were 
legal.  Governments rarely prosecuted themselves, and the higher levels of government were 
sufficiently weak that they could not provide a check on local corruption.  Newspapers had long 
provided exposure of corrupt practices, but in many smaller cities the news media was 
sufficiently tied to the political establishment that it was unlikely to trumpet information 
unfavorable to that establishment.   
 
By the early twentieth century, the full apparatus of modern checks on corruption were in 
place.  Rules had generally replaced discretion in many areas such as patronage.  Different levels 
of government more effectively patrolled each other.  Greater competition and political 
independence in the news media meant that corrupt activities and charges of corruption were 
more likely to be reported everywhere in America, not just in the big cities.  Finally, voter 
expectations about corrupt behavior had changed and revealed corruption was more likely to lead 
to political defeat. 
 
Because the costs of corruption rose along so many margins, it is hard to determine what Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  20
particular factor or set of factors were most important.  Still, American history does provide a 
striking story of a country that changed from a place where political bribery were routine events 
infecting politics at all levels to a nation that now ranks amongst the least corrupt in the world. Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  21
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Figure 1 
Indexes of Corruption and Fraud: 1815 to 1975 







1.2 NYTimes (Corr, Fraud)/Political
Ancestry (Corr, Fraud)/January
Ancestry (Corr, Fraud)/Politic*
Index of Corruption and Fraud
 
Sources: NY Times: on-line, fully-searchable edition of the New York Times from ProQuest 
Information and Learning Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan.  Ancestry: Ancestry.com, part of 
MyFamily.com, Inc., Provo, Utah. 
 
Notes: The series for the New York Times gives counts of the words “corrupt*” and “fraud*” 
divided by counts of the word “political,” where an asterisk (*) indicates that all variants are 
selected.  The search engine (Proquest) gives the number of separate articles containing at least 
one “hit.”  The series for Ancestry gives counts of the words “corrupt*” and “fraud*” divided by 
counts of the word “politic*.”  The search engine (Ancestry.com) gives the number of newspaper 
pages containing at least one “hit.”  The number of separate newspapers changes over time as 
does the mix of papers.  For example, the numbers at five year intervals from 1820 to 1935 are: 
1820 3  1825 3  1830 10  1835 4  1840 6  1845 8   
1850 10  1855 16  1860 18  1865 18  1870 19  1875 33 
1880 42  1885 46  1890 53  1895 53  1900 45  1905 50   
1910 48  1915 51  1920 47  1925 41  1930 37  1935 33   
Because newspapers are constantly being added at Ancestry.com, these numbers apply to those 
available as of July 2004.  All series are expressed here as three-year centered moving averages. Glaeser and Goldin, Corruption and Reform  25
Table 1 
Thumbnail Sketches of Events during Local Time-Series Peaks in Corruption and Fraud Activity 
 
Year(s)  Index  Corruption and Fraud Events 
1820  0.567  Impeachment proceedings against the governor of Pennsylvania (most of 
the available newspapers in Ancestry.com were from PA). 
1837-45 0.611  to 
0.870 
Whig accusations of corruption by the Van Buren administration, 
particularly in 1840 (election year).  After Harrison died in office, the 
Tyler assumption of the presidency brought charges of corruption by 
those who thought he should be an interim president.  Tammany Hall 
corruption scandals also dotted the news. 
1857-59 0.711  to 
0.837 
Voting irregularities after the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  The pro-slave 
voting by Missourians in the Kansas elections and the “Lecompton 
Constitution” were deemed fraudulent and corrupt. 
1870-79 0.876  to 
1.03 
Voter intimidation in the South by the Ku Klux Klan and various aspects 
of Reconstruction (including carpetbaggers, use of Federal money by the 
Radicals and the Freedmen’s Bureau) were deemed corrupt.  The 1872 
election, Greeley’s alleged connections to Tammany Hall.  The Crédit 
Mobilier corruption scandal and various criticisms of the Union Pacific 
Railroad.  Other corruption during the Grant administration, including the 
Whiskey Ring.  The 1876 Democratic candidate, Tilden, was known for 
breaking the Tweed Ring and the Canal Ring and this made corruption a 
major issue in the presidential election.  The election was heavily 
contested and although Tilden appears to have won the popular vote a 
senatorial committee awarded the disputed electoral votes to Hayes. 
1893  0.635  No single or major issue.  Financial panic appears to have led people to 
place blame.  Three major railroads collapsed and stock fraud was 
discussed.  Land grant fraud in the Northern Great Plains was alleged.  
Corrupt appointments in the Cleveland administration were discussed as 
were claims that continued exclusion of southern Democrats from 
Congress would lead to corruption. 
1925-28 0.264  to 
0.274 
The Teapot Dome scandal of the early 1920s was raised during the 1928 
presidential election as an indication of Coolidge’s corruption.  Albert 
Fall was tried for his involvement in Teapot Dome.  Andrew Mellon, 
Treasury Secretary was investigated.  Also the barring and subsequent 
reinstatement of Alfred Smith from his Senate seat for corrupt 
fundraising.  Speak-easies and other “corrupt” ways to get around 
Prohibition and the power of organized crime.  Congress passed the 
“corrupt practices act” in 1925 governing campaign expenditures. 
1951-52  0.269  Scandal in the IRS led to the dismissal of many people and the discovery 
of misuse of funds in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.  Kefauver 
headed Senate committee to examine influence of organized crime in the 
government and exposed many. 
 
 